High interest rates to defend the exchange rate signal that a government is committed to fixed exchange rates, but may also signal weak fundamentals. We test the effectiveness of the interest rate defense by disaggregating into the effects on future interest rates differentials, expectations of future exchange rates, and risk premia. While much previous empirical work has been inconclusive due to offsetting effects, tests that disaggregate the effects provide significant information. Raising overnight interest rates strengthens the exchange rate over the short-term, but also leads to an expected depreciation at a horizon of a year and longer and an increase in the risk premium, consistent with the argument that it also signals weak fundamentals.
Introduction
Raising the short-term interest rate is often used to defend a currency under attack. The interest rate defense has had both successes and failures, some quite spectacular. Hong Kong increased overnight rates to several hundred percent and successfully defended its currency in October 1997 against speculative attack. Sweden similarly increased its interest rate by several hundred percent in its currency defense in September 1992, but the success was short-lived.
Other cases of both success and failure can be cited, so that even a first look at episodes leaves very much open the question of the effectiveness of an interest rate defense.
Formal econometric tests of this question are also inconclusive. As Kraay (2003, p. 297) puts it, in speculative attacks in developed and developing economies, there is "a striking lack of any systematic association whatsoever between interest rates and the outcome of speculative attacks." Hence, we really have no clear answer to the question: Is raising the interest rate effective in defending a currency?
This leads to a more fundamental question, namely: Why do high interest rates deter speculation? The standard argument is that they increase the opportunity cost of speculation.
When speculators borrow domestic currency to speculate against a fixed exchange rate (when they "short" the domestic currency), high short-term interest rates make such borrowing very costly. However, this argument runs into a simple "arithmetic" problem. If the horizon over which devaluation is expected is extremely short, interest rates must be raised to extraordinarily high levels to deter speculation even when the expected devaluation is small. For example, even if foreign currency assets bore no interest, an expected overnight devaluation of 0.5 percent would require an annual interest rate of over 500% ( ( ) to make speculation unprofitable. (See, for example, the discussion in Furman and Stiglitz [1998] .) . ) * 1005 1 100 517 365 
− =
This reasoning has called into question how effective very high overnight interest rates can be in deterring an attack, and has been used to explain why the interest rate defense may be ultimately unsuccessful. Though the "arithmetic problem" addresses the question of why "spectacular" defenses may have only limited effects, it raises other questions. On the one hand, why then is the interest rate defense sometimes successful, especially when the interest rate used to defend is not spectacularly high? And, why do short-lived increases in interest rates often appear to have much longer-term effects? On the other hand, why does an interest rate defense sometimes appear to lead to even greater speculative pressures against the currency? The effects of raising interest rates must reflect more than a simple cost-of-borrowing effect.
In this paper we investigate these questions by decomposing the effects of an increase in the interest rate on the short-run expected exchange rate into a number of (potentially offsetting) effects. Our focus is empirical, but one suggested by a specific conceptual approach to the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of interest rate defense. We argue that the effects of high interest rates may reflect the information that increasing interest rates provides to market participants. If so, the direct cost implications of high interest rates for speculators may be secondary to the signal they provide. By raising interest rates, a government signals that it is committed to fixed exchange rates, but it may also signal weak fundamentals. Hence, a key empirical implication is that raising interest rates leads to the expectation that future rates will be high, but may also increase the probability speculators assign to collapse. As a consequence, the net effect may be ambiguous.
A key argument is that if the effects of high interest rates reflect the expectations they engender about future policy (via the signal about unobserved government characteristics under asymmetric information), then these effects should appear in expectations of future exchange and interest rates. Hence, tests of the effectiveness of the interest rate defense looking at these forward-looking variables should be informative. Empirical testing along these lines is the focus of this paper.
Our main conclusion is that while tests looking at the effect of high interest rates on "summary measures" like the outcome of an attack (or the very short-term expected exchange rate) are often inconclusive, tests that "disaggregate" these effects both across different time horizons and across different determinants of short-term expected exchange rates (interest differentials, risk premia, and long-term expectations) provide significant information. The inconclusiveness of tests using summary measures may be due to offsetting effects, with tests on disaggregated measures displaying some clear regularities to explain these offsetting effects.
Raising overnight interest rates strengthens the exchange rate over the short-term for most countries in our sample via its effects on short-term interest rate differentials, consistent with signaling commitment to defend. However, raising overnight interest rates leads to an expected depreciation at a horizon of a year and longer, consistent with the argument that it also signals weak fundamentals. High overnight rates also weaken the exchange rate via an increase in the risk premium, consistent with the argument that they increase the risk of default.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we quickly review standard empirical tests of the interest rate defense, in which the probability of the fixed rate regime being maintained is related to the stance of monetary policy. Given the inconclusiveness of the tests, we argue that an alternative approach is required. In section 3, we consider tests of the effects of the interest rate defense via the term structure of exchange rate expectations and interest rates, using data from eight European countries. We show that disaggregating the effect of raising overnight interest rates in the way outlined in the previous paragraph provides significant information that is hidden in a test on a summary measure. These results are consistent with the signaling hypothesis, but also in part with other arguments, as we will outline. Section 4 presents a summary of our main findings, as well as concluding comments.
Testing the Effectiveness of Interest Rate Defense
We begin by reviewing the evidence on tests of the effectiveness of raising the interest rate to defend against speculative attack, as well as conceptual arguments on why such tests may be inconclusive. The most obvious test is to relate some measure of the level of interest rates or monetary policy to attack outcomes. Recent empirical literature has produced a number of empirical tests of the effectiveness of interest rate defense of this sort.
The best known paper is probably that of Kraay (2003) , who studies a large cross-country sample of fixed exchange rate crises, and relates the stance of monetary policy to the outcome of the crisis (collapse or survival of the peg). He uses an instrumental variable probit technique to control for the endogeneity of the interest rate, since both the degree to which a country raises interest rates and the probability that an attack succeeds (for given interest rates) are likely to depend on the amount speculative pressure it faces. Hence, heavy speculative pressure may lead a country to raise interest rates sharply but may also make failure likely, so that there is a correlation between interest rates and attack outcomes that has nothing to do with the effectiveness of interest rate defense ceteris paribus, that is, when speculative pressure or characteristics are controlled for. 1 As indicated above, he finds little significant relationship between monetary policy and attack outcomes one way or the other. Other studies of this sort include Goldfajn and Gupta (1998) and Dekle, Hsiao, and Wang (1999) , who find more support for the conventional view. On the whole, the evidence is inconclusive.
Theoretically, the inconclusiveness of tests should not be surprising. To see why, consider the uncovered interest parity condition
where i and i * represent the domestic and international interest rate, respectively, and S is the (log of the) exchange rate in terms of domestic per unit of foreign currency. denotes the expectation with respect to period t+k, formed in period t (so that
is simply the oneperiod ahead devaluation expectation). P, the residual from uncovered interest parity, captures a currency and a default risk premium.
Speculative pressure on would be reflected in increases in the expected one-period ahead exchange rate or in the risk premium , so that interest rate defense could be thought of as the policy of letting i increase along with devaluation pressure on the right-hand side to leave unchanged. Hence, for a given amount of speculative pressure (the right-hand side components of (1) other than i t S t t S , 1 + t P t S * and S), a high enough nominal interest rate will successfully defend the peg in the very short term, that is, it will ensure that interest rate parity holds.
However, one cannot hold other components of (1) constant. Put another way, a failure of the policy of raising interest rates must reflect higher interest rates increasing speculative pressure against the exchange rate, reflected in a positive effect on or , a possible "perverse" feedback effect.
Hence, instead of relating interest rates to exchange rate outcomes, one really needs to examine whether there are feedback effects from interest rates back to speculative pressure.
3
Why might raising interest rates have the effect of raising speculative pressure? One though interest rate defense may have been effective on a per-country basis, controlling for inflation. 2 One must distinguish an attack that succeeds due to the failure of a defense from an attack that succeeds because the government chooses not to defend. If defense requires an extremely high interest rate maintained over some period of time, the government may find it too costly to defend. 3 Hubrich (2001) proposes to look not at the relationship between interest rates and exchange rate outcomes, but at that between interest rates and speculative pressure (as identified through a structural econometric model), and to estimate the feedback effects implied by different models.
argument is that high interest rates cause the fundamentals themselves to deteriorate, an argument suggested by Drazen and Masson (1994) . For example, if pressure against a currency reflects the belief that a weak fiscal position means that debt will have to be monetized, then raising interest rates only worsens the fiscal position, raising expectations of further monetization. This argument is explored in detail by Lahiri and Végh (2003) . Alternatively, higher interest rates may destabilize an already weak banking system, leading to the belief that defense of the fixed exchange rate must soon be abandoned (see, for example, Furman and Stiglitz [1998] or Radelet and Sachs [1998] ).
A different type of argument is suggested by Drazen (2000 Drazen ( , 2003 , namely, signaling of unobserved government characteristics. That is, there are unobserved characteristics of the government that affect the probability that a defense will be mounted or continued, with policy choices being correlated with these characteristics. Hence, with imperfect information about these government characteristics, speculators use observed policy choices to make inferences about them and hence form (that is, update) the probability they assign to a devaluation. Raising interest rates therefore may affect speculator's behavior because it serves as a signal of the government's willingness or of its ability to defend the exchange rate. (This argument may be seen as more generally concerning exchange rate intervention.)
The signaling view suggests not only why raising interest rates may increase speculative pressures, but also why the effect may be ambiguous, leading to inconclusive empirical tests.
The effect of raising interest rates on speculative pressure depends on what speculators believe it is signaling. If very high interest rates are taken as indicating the government's determination to defend the exchange rate (no matter what the cost, one is tempted to add), then high interest rates may succeed in lowering speculative pressure. This is certainly the signal governments that engage in "spectacular" defenses would like to send. However, very high interest may be taken to indicate very weak fundamentals (or, more generally, "panic"), in which case there will be a "perverse" effect -raising interest rates would only encourage speculation.
If the signal content of high interest rates is important, empirical tests in a cross section of countries may be inconclusive if different things are being signaled in different countries.
Moreover, even within a country at a point in time, the effect may be ambiguous if the signal is mixed or unclear, that is, if speculators infer that both willingness to defend and weak fundamentals are being signaled, or if they are unsure what is being signaled. It may also be that different unobserved characteristics are being signaled at different horizons, a point that we stress in our empirical tests.
A further implication of the signaling approach is that there may be "disproportionalities" in the effect of interest rates on speculative activity. Raising interest rates may dampen speculation far more than an "arithmetic" argument may suggest or may have little effect. To the extent that it sends a negative signal, it may actually increase speculative pressures. If a "persistent" fundamental is signaled, then a short-lived increase in interest rates may have a much longer-term effect. Finally, the effects may be not only of different strengths at different horizons, but also of different signs, raising interest rates strengthening the exchange rate in the very short term, but weakening it at a longer horizon. We now turn to empirical assessment of interest rate defense on the basis of these insights.
The Effect of Raising Interest Rates at Different Horizons
A natural direct test of these ideas consists of relating exchange rate expectations and risk premia at different horizons to interest rate policy. Therefore this section uses a set of survey data for exchange rate forecasts at different horizons to study the effect of interest rates on exchange rate expectations during the 1992/3 ERM crisis.
The analysis is geared towards investigating a number of possible effects. First, the impact of interest rates on exchange rate expectations is allowed to be non-linear, consistent with the argument that the information content of the policy may not be proportional to the level of the interest rate. Second, signaling models also suggest that temporary policies have longer-run effects, in that the signaling effect of high interest rates may outlast the high interest rate policy itself. This can be examined by looking at the 'term structure' of exchange rate expectations:
Does interest rate policy affect exchange rate expectations similarly at all horizons, or does it only have an impact on short-term expectations? The more the effect is spread out across the term structure, the more it would seem that something 'fundamental' is being signaled. In addition, the analysis enables us to distinguish between the effects of policy on future interest rates and those on risk-and term premia (with the effect on exchange rate expectations being the sum of both).
A. Empirical Framework
Recalling that refers to the expectation of the value of X at time t+j as formed at time t (the current value is denoted
), we write the interest parity condition (1) as:
Here k denotes the maturity of the underlying asset (in other words, we are looking at, say, a kmonth money market rate). is the interest rate differential and is the risk premium from t to t+k (which may include a term premium, a currency risk premium, and a default risk premium). 
In other words, the above allows us to decompose next month's expected exchange rate into the accumulated effects of interest rate expectations and risk over four different horizons. (Note that under a pure expectations hypothesis of interest rates, is the expected interest rate over the j-month interval from t+k to t+k+j, so that is the onemonth interest differential expected for t+k as of t. Other differences in (3) have similar interpretations.) As interest rates increase and risk decreases, the exchange rate components decrease (i.e., the exchange rate appreciates). This represents the common intuition underlying the interest parity condition that higher interest rates will appreciate exchange rates, while increases in risk premia (if not matched by interest rates) will lead to a depreciation.
A key notion to take away from this decomposition is that is essentially a sum that we can break down into seven individual components along two dimensions -term and the components of interest rates versus risk premia. This is illustrated by the following By examining how each of the inner components reacts individually to interest rate policy (identified as changes in a very short-term money market rate), we hope to better understand the effects of raising interest rates and to be able to distinguish signaling effects from other, competing hypotheses. In general, we would expect that if interest rate policy bears an information content that outlasts the policy itself, then interest rate policy should have longerterm effects. These would show up in the above decomposition as decreases in the interest rate components (representing increases in interest rate expectations) that are spread out across the different horizons.
To make this clearer, suppose first that an increase in the overnight policy rate is seen as providing no information about future interest rate policy. (Assume for simplicity of exposition that term premia are zero, so that the k-month interest rate is simply the sum of expected onemonth interest rates from t to t+k.) If the central bank raises the overnight interest rate (the policy rate) in response to an attack, this might raise interest rates at very short horizons, but in the absence of information effects, there would be no significant effect on interest rates beyond the term over which the policy rate is kept high. Consequently, only the analogous short-term components of in (3) would improve. For example, suppose it is believed that a high overnight rate at t will be maintained for a week to fend off an attack and then brought back down. The interest rate differential at t, , for every horizon k will increase, but the interest rates for periods beyond the week (that is, , , et cetera in the monthly data) would be unchanged. By equations (3) the
expected exchange rate beyond the one-week horizon (the left-hand side of the equations) would also be unchanged. Since is simply the sum of these terms as in (2), it would be unaffected as well in the absence of information or signaling effects.
In contrast, now suppose that the temporary policy signals a permanent change in the policy stance in the sense of a commitment to supporting the exchange rate. This translates into permanently higher expectations of the one-month interest rate ("permanent" as long as this commitment is believed to hold), so that the interest rate components at all horizons in (3a)- (3c) will decrease. This will appreciate exchange rate expectations across the board and result in a positive appreciation, as compared to the zero effect when information or signaling effects are absent. As discussed above, this is the signal a defense is meant to send Finally, the decomposition of the exchange rate term component into an interest rate term and a risk term allows us to analyze separately the effect on the risk-and term premia. For example, if the Sachs-Stiglitz argument is correct (whereby higher interest rates may weaken the banking sector), we should detect an increase in the risk components in response to an interest rate policy hike, as risk premia increase. 4 This would be another "perverse feedback" effect.
B. Data and Regression Equations
To perform the decomposition implied by equations (2) and (3) as illustrated in the matrix, we use monthly data for nine European countries -Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Ireland and Spain 5 -for the time period around the 1992/3 ERM crisis to construct monthly time series for those seven components. The data cover the period of 9 4 As data are available for exchange rate expectations and interest rates over different horizons, we are able to obtain data for as the residual from interest rates and exchange rate expectations at the different horizons, essentially using (3). If interest rate forecasts and k-month forward rates were consistently available as well, we could also decompose into three components (a currency risk, default risk, and term premium). Interest rates forecasts were indeed available for a small subset of the data, and were used for a cursory exploration of the role of term premia. Forward rate data were available throughout -we refrained, however, from using them to make a distinction between currency and default risk since this distinction is not the focus of our present work.
An obvious and interesting additional country would have been the UK. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain sufficiently long money market rate series from Bloomberg (which is the source for the money market data for all the other countries). This reflects in part the lack of data at the beginning of the sample period, and in part the fact that the pound sterling left the EMS in the fall of 1992, thus shortening the relevant period to begin with. exchange rates fixed against the benchmark country Germany.
7 These data permit to construct the four exchange rate series on the right-hand side of (2), thus permitting us to look at the term structure of exchange rate.
Exchange rate forecasts were published monthly in the Financial Times Currency
Forecaster. This is a 'combined consensus forecast', the geometric mean of a sample of professional currency forecasts from commercial banks and other multinational corporations.
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The reference currency for these forecasts is the US Dollar, so the US Dollar/DM forecast has been used to construct exchange rate forecasts relative to the DM. The forecasts come out monthly on the fourth Thursday of the month, from data gathered earlier in the week. k-month interest rate differentials (with respect to Germany) are represented through money market rates (from the day of the exchange rate forecast) that were obtained from Bloomberg. The "risk" data could then be backed out as the residual, according to (3a)-(3c).
The following seven equations were estimated for each country (one for each cell in 
10 6 Shorter time periods are used due to limited data availability (Italy, Sweden, Ireland) or in cases where countries left the EMS and/or the exchange rate was officially floated after the crisis (Italy, Sweden, Norway), in order to keep the sample restricted to "fixed" episodes 7 Technically, with the exception of Norway and Sweden, these countries were part of the EMS system where each country agreed to fix its currency to within a band around a weighted basket of all other participating currencies. Treating Germany as the (sole) benchmark country simplifies the analysis, and is justified in light of the fact that the DM had the biggest weight in that basket. 8 Optimally, one would like to use expectations at a higher (say weekly) frequency to examine the very short-run effects of interest rate increases on the expected exchange rate. Unfortunately, such data do not exist, at least for this set of currencies in this time period. 
The main regressor is an overnight or one-day money market rate differential , which presumably reflects the degree to which the government chooses to engage in an interest rate defense. Some of the governments in the sample actually increased overnight rates to engage in interest rate defense, which should be picked up well by these very short-term rates. Other governments merely engaged in interest rate defense to the extent that they chose not to intervene, and "let" money market rates be driven up by devaluation expectations. This interest differential is obtained as the average (from daily observations) between two exchange rate forecasts, expressed in percentage points. It is allowed to enter squared as well, in order to assess non-linearities related to signaling.
The only other regressor (aside from a constant) is , the actual observed exchange rate at the time of the forecast. This regressor was included to try to control, at least partially, for potential biases stemming from the endogeneity of the policy measure . It is likely that the same factors that affect policy (the onset of a crisis, speculative pressure etc.) also have a direct effect on the dependent variable through the error term ε, which might lead to an endogeneity bias in the coefficients a and b. To the extent that these factors also lead to movements of the actual exchange rate (within its band t S * t t t r r dr − ≡ 9 ), including the exchange rate can control for this effect. Due to a lack of good instrumental variables we have been unable to treat endogeneity more formally, so that we cannot be entirely certain that the estimation is free of biases stemming from endogeneity.
In order to be able to focus on the term structure (without distinguishing between interest rate and 'risk' components), the following three equations were also estimated (the implied equation for is identical to (4g)):
During the 1992-3 crisis, there were substantial fluctuations within the band, and periods of strong speculative attacks were often characterized by the fact that the exchange rate under attack hit the boundary of the band. In addition, there were realignments and widening of bands during the estimation period. Including the actual exchange rate as a regressor is a natural way of trying to control for such events. 
Note that since the risk premia P were backed out treating (3a)-(3c) as an identity, the estimated coefficients in (5a)-(5c) are linked to those in (4a)-(4g) by construction: a 1 + a 4 = a 8 , a 2 + a 5 = a 9 , and so forth. The economic equivalent of this is that the effect of interest rate policy on exchange rate expectations is the sum of its effect on interest rates and risk premia (see table 1 ).
Before running the actual regressions, we explored the time-series properties of the data with a battery of unit-root tests. We found that for the majority of the series we could reject the unit root hypothesis at the 10% level, using augmented Dickey-Fuller tests that included a constant term but no trend. Most failures to reject the unit-root hypothesis occurred for interest rate series, where we could reject the unit-root only for about 50% of the series. Since nonstationary interest rates are difficult to conceptualize economically, we attribute these failures to the weakness of the tests due to the generally small sample size for the regressions. Therefore, being aware of the problems involved with over-differencing the data, we decided to run the regressions in levels as laid out above.
C. Estimation and Reporting of Results
We estimated equations (4a)-(4g) or (5a)-(5c) on a country-by-country basis using GMM.
Standard errors are both heteroskedasticity-consistent and accounting for up to 12 autocorrelation lags in the (monthly) data.
In addition we estimated two cross-country versions of the model, distinguishing between "crisis" and "non-crisis" periods. 10 In the absence of an exogenous crisis indicator, we chose to look at interest rate levels in order to make this distinction. Interest rates generally were higher during the beginning of the sample in 1989, came down as inflation expectations were reduced and monetary policy aligned in EMS member countries, and finally shot up sharply starting in the fall of 1992 with the onset of the various crises. This pattern implies that differentiating 12 10 There are two exceptions to using GMM. First, there where not enough data available to include autocorrelation lags for Italy. Second, the cross-country samples ("crisis" and "no crisis") were estimated without autocorrelation lags as well due to the patchy nature of the sample, with crisis and non-crisis periods alternating throughout the sample.
between periods simply by picking an interest rate threshold level for identifying crisis periods would be misleading. We chose a heuristic approach instead, noting that the first (interest rate) signs of the looming ERM crisis appeared in December of 1991 in Sweden. We took that date as the dividing line and labeled the period 1989:01 -1991:11 "no crisis" and the period 1991:12 -1994:12 "crisis" for all countries, keeping in mind the systemic nature of the crisis as well. The data were pooled in the two sub-samples, effectively forcing coefficients to be identical across countries.
Since the policy variable of interest, , enters the regression quadratically, the point estimates of the coefficients are difficult to interpret. Therefore in tables 2-11 we report, column of the table we shows tests against the null hypothesis that all the coefficients b in the regression are equal to zero, in effect testing for the overall non-linearity present in the regression. It turns out that linearity is rejected throughout, with very few exceptions. For these two countries, linearity was rejected when looking at the interest rate and 'risk' components separately. At the bottom of the top block, we show tests of the importance of splitting up a given term component into an interest rate and a 'risk' component. For that split, it tests whether the coefficients a and b are identical across interest rate and "risk" equations. While equality sometimes cannot be rejected for individual coefficients, especially for the early 2-3 month term, it is mostly rejected for both coefficients combined, especially when all terms are considered simultaneously. To summarize, the Wald tests reject both the linearity of the impact of the policy rate, and the equality of that impact across interest rate versus 'risk' components. This points towards the non-linearities to be expected from a signaling environment, and it suggests that the distinction between interest rate and 'risk' components will yield additional insight.
In the bottom block of each table, we use the point estimates to calculate the impact of an increase in the policy rate at different horizons. A negative value implies that increasing the interest rate reduces the term component, and therefore appreciates . In particular, positive signaling (for example, with high interest rates signaling strong commitment to defend) would imply a negative entry in the case of S or di. For any size interest rate increase, the overall effect on exchange rate expectations across the term (S in the bottom rows) can be decomposed into an interest rate effect di and a 'risk' effect P, the first and second rows, as in Table 1 above. By construction, the entry in the S rows is the sum of the corresponding di and P entries. As can be seen in Table 1 , the effect of raising the overnight interest rate on the one-month-ahead expected exchange rate is the arithmetic sum of three components -the effect on the interest rate over the twelve-month horizon, the effect on risk premia over the twelve-month horizon, and the effect of the expected exchange rate at a horizon of greater than twelve months. We use this below in interpreting the results. Looking across the columns for one component in a block, we can examine the term structure of interest rate effects. The leftmost column represents the nearest term (the next two months), and the term increases as we move to the right. The far right column (labeled "1 month") reports the cumulative effect across all terms (corresponding to the far-right cells in table 1).
D. Interpretation of Results by Country
In interpreting our results, we focus primarily on the common traits across countries, where there are some clear patterns in the sample.
First, and especially striking, for every country in the sample, at almost every horizon and for almost every size of change in the interest rate, the interest rate effects are significant with an increase in the overnight interest rate leading to an increase in the interest rate at all horizons, which in turn strengthens the exchange rate. (Note that this is not just an arithmetic shifting of the whole term structure, since the columns represent the j-month interest rate from t+k to t+k+j.) This is consistent with increases in the overnight interest rate signaling an unobserved characteristic, such as commitment to defend the exchange rate.
Second, this strengthening of the currency via the interest rate component generally does not however correspond to a higher one-month-ahead exchange rate forecast , as seen in the southeast corner of the lower block in each table (the entries under "1 month" for expected exchange rates). The effect of raising the overnight interest rate on is insignificantly different from zero for three of the countries in the sample (Denmark, Italy, and Sweden). In three cases raising overnight rates actually leads to an expected depreciation one month out (Belgium, France, and Ireland). In only two of the eight countries, Spain and Norway, does raising the overnight rate lead to an expected strengthening one month out. Even in this case, the expected appreciation is far less than what the interest rate effect alone would predict. The reason that high interest rates do not lead to an expected appreciation in our sample countries is that the interest rate effect is generally offset by a risk effect (at horizons greater than one month) of the opposite sign. This phenomenon is observed strongly and very consistently in four of the eight countries (Denmark, Norway, Spain, and Sweden) and to a lesser/less consistent degree in Italy and Ireland. It is striking that the interest rate components di and the 'risk' components P quite often have significant movements of the about the same size, but in opposite directions. Interest rate defense therefore seems to increase interest rate expectations and ceteris paribus appreciate , but this is in general offset by an adverse increase in risk premia. The two exceptions to this pattern are Belgium and France, where increases in the overnight interest rate do not lead to a significant increase in the 'risk' term. One possible explanation is that these countries were argued to be "core" countries in the ERM, and therefore may have been believed to have had a greater ability to borrow reserves.
11 This would be consistent with the model in the sense that increases in the policy interest rate would be less likely to be taken as a sign of low reserves. In both cases, the positive interest rate effect was offset by a higher expected depreciation at horizons of twelve months or greater as a result of the increases in the overnight rate, as was also found in Denmark, Ireland, and Italy.
Both the interest rate and the risk terms are usually stronger in the longer term, thus revealing important long-term effects for the usually short-term interest rate policy. The joint occurrence of these two effects leads to a much smaller, more ambiguous effect on the exchange rate expectations (the S rows) across the horizon. The "average" effect on exchange rate expectations seems to be a small appreciation (a decrease) in the short term, coupled with a deterioration in the long-term components, yielding a slightly positive and often insignificant overall effect, usually on the order of less than 0.05%. The long-term deterioration tends to be driven both by higher risk premia at the 4-11 month horizon and by a deterioration in the expected exchange rate 12 months out. The latter could not be decomposed into interest rate and risk components due to a lack of longer-term exchange rate forecasts, but it may well be driven by risk premia as well. In other words, it appears that interest rate expectations dominate in the short run, while 'risk' dominates the long run, and the two cancel out much of each other along the way.
Finally, regarding non-linearities, it is often the case that -for any of the components S, di or P -the larger interest rate increases have different effects than the smaller ones. The direction of that non-linearity, however, varies considerably across countries in the sample.
Taken as a whole, this pattern suggests that certainly more is going on than the mere "arithmetic", opportunity cost-based effects of interest rate defense. We argue that these results are consistent with a signaling argument. Short-term interest rate policy has strong effects on the interest rate expectations embedded in long-term interest rates, with the sign of these effects suggesting that an increase in overnight interest rates is taken as a signal to defend the exchange 11 We are indebted to Richard Portes for pointing this out.
rate over a longer horizon. Moreover, these effects are often non-linear in nature. These findings point towards information effects triggered by interest rate policy. Note here that the signaling hypothesis would support both concavities (larger increases have smaller relative effects) and convexities. Concavities could arise when the mere "activation" of interest rate policy, even only a mild increase, signals the general preparedness of the government to use monetary policy in defense of the exchange rate. Convex relationships, by contrast, could arise when only unusually or unexpectedly high, "extreme" interest rates signal news about the policy.
The evidence gives more support to the former, whereby the (informational) effect of interest rate increases is largely captured by small changes.
An alternative argument for non-linear effects is that suggested by Lahiri and Végh (2001) . They stress the interaction between the direct effect of higher interest rates on demand for domestic currency and the effect on government finances -higher interest rates worsen the fiscal position and induce the expectation of greater future monetization. The first effect strengthens the domestic currency, while the second weakens it. In their set-up, they find that the first effect dominates for small increases in the interest rate, while the second dominates for large increases. The effects differ over the horizon, with the first effect being stronger in the short-term, the second in the long-term.
It is also interesting to note that risk premia react as well, and almost as strongly, to interest rate policy. This could be associated with the Sachs-Stiglitz argument, grounded in the adverse effects of high interest rates on the domestic banking sector, and increasing default risk premia accordingly. However, it might also be associated with a "negative" signaling story along the lines of high policy interest rates signaling low reserves (or the lack of alternatives to an interest rate defense). In that case, the peg may appear weaker than previously thought, which would increase currency risk premia.
E. Some Additional Results
The trends borne out by the country-specific regressions are mainly driven by the "crisis" sub-sample. As shown in table 10, interest rate defense increases interest rate expectations (thus supporting the exchange rate ceteris paribus), but deteriorates mid-term risk premia as well as long-term (that is, 12+ months) exchange rate expectations. Interest rate defense comes out as ineffective overall, as the net effect is a partially significant deterioration of the one-month ahead exchange rate expectation. The "no crisis" sub-sample (table 11) , by contrast, bears out a conventional (beneficial) response, albeit a weak one.
Comparing the two sub-samples more closely, it is interesting to note that the difference in terms of the overall effect varies across time. Compare the bottom three rows of tables 10 and 11. Overall, it appears that during non-crisis periods tight monetary policy deteriorates the short-to medium part of exchange rate expectations, but instills long-term confidence enough so that the overall effect is mildly supportive of the exchange rate. Crisis-periods, by contrast, have the opposite pattern. Interest rate defense shores up short-to medium term expectations, but deteriorates mid-to long term expectations due to its effect on risk premia, with the net effect being adverse.
A possible interpretation is that during non-crisis periods tight monetary policy may signal both negative fundamentals and a willingness to defend the exchange rate. A contraction in a seemingly "calm" environment may be perceived as a sign of imminent trouble, thus deteriorating short-to medium term expectations, while longer-term expectations are improved in light of the policymaker's demonstrated resolve to support the exchange rate. In crisis periods, by contrast, the current negative fundamentals are well established and known. High interest rates are perceived as an effective short-to medium treatment of the symptoms, and stabilize exchange rate expectations accordingly. From a long-term perspective, however, the perceived new degree of vulnerability of the system, inferred from the government's demonstrated concern and resolve to intervene, more than outweighs the increased confidence in its ability to deal with future episodes, which seem sure to come. In summary: during calm episodes, tight monetary policy signals short-term frictions and long-term health. During crisis episodes, it relieves pain effectively in the short-term, but emphasizes the long-term severity of the condition.
Another possible split of the data is into EMS and non-EMS countries to see if EMS
membership per se made a difference. Since this would have amounted to merely grouping Norway and Sweden in one group and all other countries in another, we opted against such a "split". However, simply examining the country results with EMS membership in mind is instructive. Most importantly, all of the countries that had clearly adverse interest rate defense results were EMS countries (Belgium, France, and Ireland). By contrast, Norway (non-EMS)
was one of only two countries with a clearly beneficial overall effect. Sweden, the other non-EMS country, was ambiguous overall, as were Italy and Denmark in the EMS, and Spain was the only EMS country with a clearly effective interest rate defense. So in the most general sense, there might be an indication here that non-EMS countries did better than EMS countries 12 .
A possible interpretation is that the systemic ties within the EMS may actually have made the crisis worse for a number of reasons. For example, the EMS's official correction mechanism relied heavily on interventions by the strong-currency country (essentially Germany) to support the currencies coming under attack, either through direct intervention or by extending credit to countries under pressure. But Germany, still working out the enormous monetary consequences of German reunification, was unable and/or unwilling to engage in such large-scale intervention due to its impact on domestic price stability. It argued for a re-alignment instead, which was initially rejected by other EMS members 13 . To the degree that EMS countries under attack resorted to interest rate defense, they were effectively signaling that there was little to be expected in terms of interventions by Germany, which was contrary to how the EMS was supposed to work -in other words, a strong negative signal. The non-EMS countries Sweden and Norway, by contrast, had no such expectations to begin with, so the fact that they resorted to an interest rate defense carried less of a "disappointment" with it.
Finally, there is a question as to the role of capital controls during the crisis. We know, for example that Spain and Ireland officially instituted some capital controls during the September -November, 1992, period. In addition there is some indication from, e.g., offshoreonshore interest differentials that France imposed implicit controls -but the timing and extent of that policy is difficult to pin down. Overall there are not enough clear, well-documented capital controls episodes to account explicitly for this factor in our estimations 14 .
Conclusions
12 Note however that the interest rate defense in Norway was the weakest in the sample. The average differential to Germany was actually a negative 1.9%, and Norway's maximum differential in the sample is only 1.2%. 13 See Buiter et al. (1998) for a detailed discussion of the macroeconomic backdrop leading up to the 1992 crisis, as well as anecdotes showing the rift between Germany and other EMS members at high-level crisis summits such as the Euromeeting in Bath of September 5/6, 1992. 14 We tried inserting a capital controls dummy in the regressions for Spain. The dummy effectively reduced interest rate expectations (capital controls being a substitute) and increased risk premia (possibly because of the associated liquidity issues for, e.g., international speculators), with an adverse but insignificant net effect overall. We hesitate to make too much of these results, and do not report them, since the dummy is likely endogenous to the amount of pressure on the peseta and might just as well
In this paper we have considered both why high interest may be effective in deterring speculation against a currency and how one may empirically test the effectiveness of the interest rate defense. We have fleshed out one explanation for the effectiveness of high interest rates in deterring speculation, namely that high interest rates serve as a signal of the government's willingness or ability to defend the exchange rate. We also presented several types of econometric evidence consistent with the signaling approach.
Our key empirical findings are as follows. First, the effects of changes in overnight interest rates are clearly non-linear, often significantly so, and these effects may be either concave or convex. This is in contrast to the simple "arithmetic" argument for the effect of More specifically, there is some evidence of a positive (i.e., appreciating the exchange rate)
short-term effect, coupled with a negative longer-term effect, at horizons of 12 months or longer.
In terms of the three determinants of next month's expected exchange rate listed in table 1 (interest rates and risk premia at horizons up to twelve months, and the twelve-month-ahead exchange rate forecast), an increase in overnight interest rates often induces an increase in the nmonth ahead rate relative to the k-month ahead rate (n > k), thus implying an appreciation of , but also an increase in risk premia and , the twelve-month-ahead exchange rate forecast, implying a depreciation.
We argued that these results are consistent with the signaling hypothesis. First, the existence of longer term, non-linear effects by itself suggests that something more than the arithmetic effect is at work. The sign of short-term interest rate policy on interest rate expectations suggests that interest rate increases are taken as a sign of commitment to defend.
The deterioration over longer horizons may indicate that weak fundamental are being signaled.
As indicated, some of the results are also supportive of other models. Perhaps the most important conclusion that tests looking at the effect of high interest rates on "summary measures" like the outcome of an attack are inconclusive due to offsetting effects, which become clear when one disaggregates the effects of raising interest rates across different time horizons and across different determinants of short-term expected exchange rates. > Regressions also include current exchange rate as well as a constant term (not reported). > *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively (based on heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors). > Regressions also include current exchange rate as well as a constant term (not reported). > *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively (based on heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors).
> Dependent variables are expressed as 100xln(.) and main regressor (overnight money market rate differential) is expressed in percentage points, so results can be interpreted in terms of percentage devaluations in response to percentage point changes in policy variable. > Regressions also include current exchange rate as well as a constant term (not reported). > *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively (based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors).
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